A significant threat to wide deployment of machine learning-based classifiers is adversarial learning attacks, especially at test-time. Recently there has been significant development in defending against such attacks. Several such works seek to robustify the classifier to make "correct" decisions on perturbed patterns. We argue it is often operationally more important to detect the attack, rather than to "correctly classify" in the face of it (Classification can proceed if no attack is detected). We hypothesize that, even if humanimperceptible, adversarial perturbations are machine-detectable. We propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detector (AD), based on suitable (null hypothesis) density models for the different layers of a deep neural net and a novel decision statistic built upon the Kullback-Leibler divergence. This paper addresses: 1) when is it appropriate to aim to "correctly classify" a perturbed pattern?; 2) What is a good AD detection statistic, one which exploits all likely sources of anomalousness associated with a test-time attack? 3) Where in a deep neural net (DNN) (in an early layer, a middle layer, or at the penultimate layer) will the most anomalous signature manifest? Tested on MNIST and CIFAR-10 image databases under three prominent attack strategies, our approach outperforms previous detection methods, achieving strong ROC AUC detection accuracy on two attacks and substantially better accuracy than previously reported on the third (strongest) attack.
INTRODUCTION
Adversarial learning has become a topic of intense interest, with researchers from both the security and machine learning (ML) communities mainly focusing on devising attacks, but also some defenses against same. Focusing on statistical classification, prominent attack types include: i) corrupting labeled training data to degrade a learned classifier's accuracy, e.g. [1] , [2] , [3] ; ii) reverse engineering attacks, which seek to learn a non-public (black box/undisclosed) classifier's decision-making rule by making numerous (even random) queries to the classifier [4] ; and, perhaps most importantly, iii) test-time attacks, wherein test (operational) examples are perturbed, human imperceptibly, but in such a way that the classifier's decision will change (and now disagrees with the consensus human decision), e.g. [5] , [6] , [7] . Such attacks may e.g. cause an autonomous vehicle to fail to recognize a road sign. This research was supported by an AFOSR DDDAS grant and a Cisco gift.
The following concerns regarding adversarial learning, raised in our recent critical review [8] , are relevant to the present paper.
1. Some test-time attacks presume the classifier is defenseless. In particular, while the perturbed patterns in [5] do induce changes to the classifier's decision (thus demonstrating the attack's "success"), they also manifest artifacts (e.g. salt and pepper noise) quite visible in their published figures. These artifacts should be relatively easy to (automatically) detect in practice, as we will show in the sequel. Thus, their attack should only be successful against a defenseless system.
2. The attacks in [6] , [5] , [9] assume that the classifier must decide on one of the K known categories -there is no possibility to reject a sample. Rejection may be the best answer, given some of the ambiguous images produced e.g. by [5] (as will be seen in the sequel). Moreover, in security-sensitive settings, where the stakes for test-time attacks are the highest, the problem is often not classification per se, but rather authentication, where if there is any significant decision uncertainty (or atypicality) associated with the presented pattern, the system should reject it. In doing so, one is deciding that the given pattern, though "closest" to a particular (authenticated/known) class, is "too anomalous" given the relative cost of false positives (e.g., invalid accesses).
3.
[5], [6] , and [9] (strongly) assumed that the classifier structure and its parameter values are known to the attacker. Recent work has proposed techniques to reverse-engineer a (black box) classifier without necessarily even knowing its structure [4] . However, a critical weakness of [4] stems from one of its (purported) greatest advantages -the paper emphasizes that their reverse-engineering does not require any labeled training samples from the domain 1the attacker's queries to the black box (used to create a training set for reverse engineering the classifier) are randomly drawn, uniformly over the given feature space. While such random querying achieves reverse-engineering, what was not recognized is that this makes the attack easily detectable by the ML service -randomly selected query patterns are very likely to be extreme outliers, of all classes. Each such query is thus individually highly suspicious by itself -a few, let alone thousands of such queries, should be trivially detected as jointly improbable under a null distribution (estimable from the training set defined over all the classes from the domain). Even reverse engineering with "informed" queries (based on some known training samples) [10] may be highly susceptible to detection.
What is common to these critiques is that [5] , [6] , [4] , and others do not consider the potential of a (purely unsupervised) anomaly detection (AD) approach for defeating the attack. While the likely effectiveness of AD to defeat [4] and even [5] 2 is clear, it is less clear such an approach will be effective against less human-perceptible attacks such as [6] , [9] . However, this will be demonstrated in the sequel. Robust Classification vs. AD Defense: Recently, there has been significant work in defending against test-time attacks. This includes [11] , [12] , [13] . The design objective assumed in these papers is to robustify the classifier so that a test pattern that is a perturbation of a pattern from class A will still be assigned to class A by the classifier. For example, [12] randomly nullify (zero) input features, during training and use/inference, in an attempt to "eliminate" perturbed features.
7 Figure 1 : Attacked image of the digit '5', based on the method from [16] . The attack is not human-imperceptible, but the image is misclassified to another digit class. Fig. 1 : Attacked image of the digit '5' based on the method from [5] , which is misclassified to another digit class.
However, a fundamental limitation of [12] , [11] , and [13] concerns semantics of inferences. Consider digit recognition. Robustness means a perturbed '5' is still classified as a '5'. This may make sense if the perturbed digit is still objectively recognizable (by a human being) as a '5'. But consider the perturbed '5' from [5] shown in Figure  1 , which is not even unambiguously recognizable as a digit. For images like this, "don't know" may be the most reasonable answer. Moreover, irrespective of whether the perturbed pattern is class-ambiguous, on its face it appears to be far more important, operationally, to recognize that the classifier is being subjected to a test-time attack than to "correctly" classify in the face of it. Once an attack is detected, measures may be taken to block the attacker's access to the classifier. Moreover, actions based on the classifier's decisions may be conservatively modified. For example, for an autonomous vehicle, the vehicle may take the following action sequence: 1) slow down, move to the side of the road, and stop; 2) await further instructions. Likewise, in a medical diagnostic setting, surely one should not try to make (automated, pre-screening) diagnosis based upon a fabricated X-ray or MRI image ! In [12] , [11] , and [13] it is presumed "correctly" classifying attacked test patterns is the "right" objective, without considering the (AD) alternative we advocate. Possible Attack Mechanisms: One can also simply recognize that there are only two mechanisms by which an attacked image is forwarded to a classifier. In one, there is an honest image generator, but it is then intercepted and perturbed by an adversary ( a "manin-the-middle" attack). However, there is a second mechanism, wherein the adversary is the generator of the original image (or has hijacked/compromised the image/sample generation mechanism). Only in the first case is it meaningful to "correctly" classify the image forwarded to the classifier, and then, only if the honest generator actually receives the decision (i.e., if it is not also intercepted by the attacker). For the latter mechanism, the classifier's decisions will be sent to the attacker -thus, making correct decisions is at best moot and at worst detrimental since it may give the attacker information (if the attacker does not precisely know the classifier's decision rule). Producing a "don't know" decision gives less information to the attacker, and does not necessarily reveal the attack has been discovered (the classifier might be known to use a rejection option, irrespective of possible attacks). Even without considering the above cases, attack detection in many (security) settings should be operationally more important than robust classification (and classification can still be performed if an attack is not detected).
Recently, several works have proposed detection of test-time attacks [14] , [15] , [16] , with an experimental assessment of these methods given in [17] . A more detailed review of many quite recent defense works is given in [18] . The closest detection system to our work is [14] . The authors did investigate anomaly detection based on hypothesis testing applied to an internal layer of a DNN classifier. However, ultimately, their paper put forward a supervised method, learning to discriminate "attack" from "no attack", using supervised attack examples generated by the methods from [6] and [5] . First, [14] 's supervised approach may only be effective in detecting attacks it was trained on. Second, the authors ultimately settled on a supervised approach because their unsupervised (pure AD) method did not achieve very good detection results. However, there are several limitations of the AD proposed in [14] , which are remedied by the novel method presented here.
• [14] only evaluated atypicality of a test sample relative to a null density model for the class predicted by the DNN classifier -the likelihood with respect to this density being lower than a threshold is one indication the sample is an attack instance. However, consider the process of generating an attack sample. One starts with a "normal" sample from one category (call it cs, the source category) and then perturbs it until the classifier's decision is altered to a destination category (call it c d ). In addition to the perturbed sample having "too low" likelihood under c d , one might also expect it to have "too high" likelihood under cs. The method proposed here exploits this additional source of atypicality and demonstrates that this yields significant gains in detection accuracy. • [14] used a Gaussian kernel-based density estimator to evaluate the likelihood under the null. We have additionally evaluated Gaussian mixture models. However, both of these choices give both positive and negative support, whereas sigmoidal and RELU activation layers have strictly positive support. Thus, we also propose here use of multivariate lognormal mixture densities, which have only positive support. • [14] only considered atypicality of the feature vector at the output of the penultimate layer of the network. Fundamentally, there is the question of where in a DNN (in an early layer, a middle layer, or at the penultimate layer) will the most anomalous signatures manifest? In fact, the most powerful version of our approach exploits anomalies which may manifest at any one of several layers.
In the benchmark comparison study in [17] , applied to the MNIST [19] and CIFAR-10 [20] image databases, the attacks included [6] , [5] and [9] . The defenses included recently proposed unsupervised ADs as well as supervised detectors, where labeled examples from known attacks are used to learn a classifier discriminating "attack" from "original" images. [17] considered three scenarios: 1) where the detector defense and classifier (including their parameter values) are completely known to the attacker; 2) where the detection method is known to the attacker, and where there is a training set available to the attacker for estimating the detector's parameters; 3) where the detection method (if any) is unknown to the attacker, but with the classifier still fully known to the attacker. Scenarios 1) and 2) are very similar vis a vis knowledge of the attacker, and we note that [17] did not disclose a general, principled attack for these cases, but rather ones customized to the (assumed perfectly known) defenses. Scenario 3) is more realistic in many cases where defenses are secret. This paper proposes a novel unsupervised defense (i.e., it does not assume any knowledge of possible attacks), with the experiments in the sequel only considering scenario 3) for different published adversarial attacks (and with comparisons made against prior published defenses). In future work, we will attempt to develop "perfect knowledge" attacks against our proposed defense, and in turn further harden our defense against them (as in a typical, ongoing security cycle) 3 .
[17] demonstrated that the Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack proposed in [9] is more difficult to detect than the attacks from [6] and [5] . They show that, on CIFAR-10, against CW, the best defense strategy, a supervised attack detection approach from [15] , achieves an 81% true positive rate (TPR) at a false positive rate (FPR) of 28%. A different supervised approach from [16] is even worse -70% TPR at an FPR of 40%. Moreover, they found that unsupervised AD via a statistical test proposed in [16] failed to detect CW attacks on CIFAR-10. They also found that the unsupervised AD in [14] described earlier grossly fails on CW attacks on CIFAR-10 -80% of the time, attacked images had even higher likelihood (under c d ) than the original (unattacked) images. Our unsupervised AD (developed next) achieves results superior to all of these. This will be seen in the sequel.
PROPOSED METHOD

Notation and Setup
Consider a "raw" feature vector x ∈ R d , which could e.g. represent a (scanned) array of gray scale values comprising a digital image. Consider an L-layer DNN. Let PDNN[C = c|x], c = 1, . . . , K be the DNN's a posteriori probability that x originates from class c, for a K-category problem. There is a labeled training set X =
Nc } are the labeled training samples from class c. We have two purposes for this training set. First, the DNN posterior model, PDNN[C|x], is learned (via a suitable DNN training method). Second, suppose that z ∈ R d(l) is the output vector for layer l of the DNN, l ∈ {2, 3, . . . , L − 1}, when x ∈ R d is the input to the DNN -layer l could be sigmoidal, an RELU, or even a max-pooling layer. Then, by feeding each of the training examples from class c, x (c) i , into the (already trained) DNN and extracting the layer l output vector for each such example, we can create a layer l derived feature vector training set conditioned on class c (with notational dependence on l omitted 3 To reiterate, much prior work on adversarial learning mainly focused on attacks and did not consider even simple, known defenses that could easily be deployed against them. For each such derived training set Z (c) , representative of class c, one can learn the class-conditional joint density, assuming a particular parametric density form and performing suitable model learning (e.g., maximum likelihood estimation, coupled with model-order selection techniques such as Bayesian Information Criterion [21] , to estimate the model structure and "order" (e.g., the number of components, in the case of a mixture density)). Denote the resulting learned class-conditional densities by f Z|c (z|c), c = 1, . . . , K. These densities together constitute a "null hypothesis model". The null hypothesis is that a test vector z ∈ R d(l) is the result of feeding in an unperturbed image x from one of the K categories into the DNN and extracting the l-th layer output of the DNN. The alternative hypothesis, thus, is that z is the result of feeding a (succesfully) attacked image, call it x , into the DNN.
Anomaly Detection of Attacks (ADA)
Consider a successful attack example -one which was obtained by starting from a "clean" example x from an (unknown) source class cs and then perturbing it until the DNN's decision on this perturbed example (now x ) is no longer cs, but is now c d = cs (the "destination" class). A test pattern z which results from feeding a successfully attacked version of x, not x itself, into the DNN, is anticipated to have atypically low likelihood under the density model for the DNNpredicted class, c * . While this can be exploited, if the perturbation of x is not very large (consistent with its human-imperceptibility), we might also expect that z will exhibit too much typicality (too high likelihood) under some class other than c * , i.e. under the source category, cs. It does not matter that the source category is unknown to us (the defender). We can simply determine our best estimate of this category as:ĉs = arg max c∈{1,...,K}−c * f Z|c (z|c), with the associated "typicality" max c∈{1,...,K}−c * f Z|c (z|c).
Accordingly, we hypothesize that attack patterns should be both "too atypical" under c * and "too typical" underĉs. While this may seem to require an unwieldy scheme involving use of two detection thresholds, we instead propose a single, theoretically-grounded decision statistic that captures both requirements. Specifically, define a two-class posterior evaluated with respect to the (density-based) null model, i. Pc log( Pc Qc ), i.e. we declare a detection when this statistic exceeds a preset threshold value.
Our expectation that an attacked pattern will exhibit both "too high atypicality" (with respect to c * ) and "too high typicality" (with respect toĉs) only assumes that the attack is seeking to be imperceptible to a human being. To achieve this, the attacked example should be definitively recognizable by a human being as a legitimate (visually artifact-free) instance of one of the K categories (cs). This constraint, in conjunction with the attack's success (the DNN classifying it to c * = cs) may necessitate that the test pattern will exhibit unusually high likelihood for a category other than that predicted by the DNN. At the same time, because the (successful) attack example should not appear to a human to belong to c * , this may necessitate that the test pattern will exhibit unusually low likelihood under c * .
2.3. ADA Improvements 1. Layer and Null Model Choices: [14] chose l = L − 1, the penultimate layer of the DNN, and used a Gaussian kernel-based density estimator. We investigate multivariate log-normal mixture densities, obtained by taking the log of each non-negative scalar feature and then modeling the resulting feature vector using a mixture of Gaussians (with model order chosen to minimize the Bayesian Information Criterion). This mixture effectively has only non-negative support, consistent with sigmoidal and RELU layers. We also investigate several different layers, l ∈ {2, 3, . . . , L − 1}, for extraction of the feature vector, z.
2. Maximizing KL over different layers: Rather than restricting to a single layer, for a given test image x one can measure the KL divergence at multiple layers and choose, as the decision statistic, the maximum KL divergence across the different layers. This may enhance detection performance (as we have observed), as anomalous signatures may not always prominently manifest in the same (e.g., penultimate) layer. We refer to this approach as ADA-maxKL.
3. Considering All Classes: Instead of just considering c d and cs, it is also possible to form probability vectors for P and Q over all classes. While our "model" for the attack suggests that most of the anomaly signature may manifest with respect to c d and cs, more information may be exploitable by considering all classes.
4. Exploiting uncertainty about cs and knowledge of class confusion: ADA as defined so far makes a hard decision estimate of the source class, cs. Alternatively, we can estimate the probability that Cs = c via
Here, αc is the class prior for class c. This can be used to evaluate an average KL divergence (considering all possibilities for cs). However, going further, suppose we have knowledge of the classifier's confusion matrix [P[C * = i|C = j]], reflecting normal class confusion in the absence of an attack (obtained e.g. from a validation set). Then, a class pair (cs, c d ) with very small confusion probability P[C * = c d |C = cs] is much more likely associated with an attack than a pair with high class confusion. Accordingly, we suggest to weight the KL divergence by
4 . This weighting increases the decision statistic for pairs unlikely to occur due to normal (non-attack) classifier confusion. Combining both these ideas, we construct the Average, Weighted ADA (AW-ADA) statistic for a given layer as:
where P (c) = [p0Pc * , p0Pc]. Moreover, this can be evaluated for different layers, with the decision statistic its maximum over all considered layers. The resulting approach is dubbed AW-ADA-maxKL.
As will be seen, this approach achieves significant improvement in detection accuracy on the CIFAR-10 data set.
5.
A "Local" Version of AWA-ADA-maxKL: Instead of modelling the joint feaure vector for a layer, we can alternatively comprehensively model low-order feature collectionsin particular, all feature pairs (each pair via a log-normal mixture density). This is a rich "low order" feature representation -for example, for a layer l with 400 features, there are N l = (400 choose 2) feature pairs that will be individually modelled. For each such feature pair, for each layer being modeled, one can form the AW-ADA statistic. Moreover, each such feature pair's statistic can be weighted based on the magnitude of the DNN weights from these features to the next layer of the DNN (higher magnitude DNN weights indicate the features in the pair are important and that their AW-ADA statistic should be given stronger influence than pairs with lower magnitude DNN weights). Accordingly, for each layer we can form a weighted aggregation of all low-order AW-ADA statistics (and then max the aggregated statistics over the layers). For a given layer, l, the resulting decision statistic can be expressed as:
where βm is the sum of the magnitudes of the DNN weights that conduct from feature m in layer l to neurons in the next layer, l + 1, normalized by the maximum such sum over all features in layer l. This statistic is then maximized over the several different layers being evaluated -note the normalization by the number of feature pairs in layer l, N l , so that there is a fair comparison of the statistics produced by each of the layers under consideration. We dub the resulting method L-AWA-ADA-maxKL, 'L' for "local". The motivation for this approach is that atypicalities may manifest on a very small subset of the features in a layer -if one null-models the joint feature vector, atypicalities in just a few features may yield only very weak assessed joint feature atypicality. On the other hand, a high degree of atypicality will be assessed for a low-order feature collection that contains the strongly atypical features. This approach is inspired by [22] , where it was found that comprehensively modeling low-order densities leads both to easy detection of anomalies with small "footprints" (only a few abnormal features, amongst many measured features) and to highly interpretable (classifier and AD) solutions. Note also that L-AWA-ADA-maxKL, although requiring many KL divergence calculations, actually has inference complexity comparable to other detection approaches and much lower than the attacker's complexity in crafting a successful attack [18] .
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Data Sets:
We experimented on the MNIST [19] and CIFAR-10 [20] data sets, both with ten classes, 50,000 training and 10,000 test images. For AD, the data batch under consideration in experiments consisted of the test images plus the crafted attack images. Classifiers: For training DNNs, we used mini-batch gradient descent with a cross entropy loss function and a mini-batch size of 256 samples. For MNIST, we trained the LeNet-5 convolutional neural-net [23] . This neural net reaches an accuracy of 98.1% on the MNIST test set. For CIFAR-10, we used a 12-layer deep neural network architecture suggested in [14] . This neural net, once trained, reaches an accuracy of 83.1% on the CIFAR-10 test set.
Attacks:
We only perturbed test images that were correctly classified. This is plausible since the attack is not by definition truly successful unless it causes a misclassification 5 . We implemented the fast gradient step method (FGSM) attack [6] and the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [5] on the image data sets. We also applied the CW attack [9] , using their source code. FGSM and CW are "global" methods, making small magnitude perturbations, but to all pixels in the image. By contrast, JSMA is a more "localized" attack, making changes to far fewer pixels, but with large changes needed to induce misclassifications. For JSMA, we implemented the version that alters a (minimal set of) dark pixels, changing them from dark to white. For each test sample, from a particular class (e.g., c), we randomly selected (in an equally likely fashion) one of the other classes (e.g., c ) and generated an attack instance starting from the test image, using the given attack algorithm, such that the classifier will assign the perturbed image to class c . In this way, for MNIST, we successfully crafted 9845 adversarial images using the JSMA attack and 9762 adversarial samples using the FGSM attack. For CIFAR-10, we only implemented the FGSM and CW attacks 6 . For this data set, we successfully crafted 9243 adversarial FGSM images and 9826 CW images. Note that, in all cases, the attack success rate was high (albeit higher on MNIST).
While FGSM is generally thought of as an "imperceptible" attack, 'ghost' artifacts are visible for MNIST. For CIFAR-10, though, we did find FGSM attacks to be visually imperceptible. JSMA attacks (on MNIST), on the other hand, are quite visually perceptible -there are extra white pixels and also visible salt and pepper noise. There is also some class ambiguity in attack examples -"don't know" may be the best answer for some of the attack images starting from the '5' and '3' categories. Thus, the JMSA attack does not in all cases meet the JMSA authors' success definition (changing the classifier's decision, but with the attack human-imperceptible and no change in a human being's labeling/decision). Results: Table  1 shows results on MNIST under the FGSM attack. We only nullmodeled the penultimate layer of the DNN. Note that all the methods work very well for MNIST, but with ADA-GMM (full covariance GMMs) giving the best results and a highly compelling 0.992 AUC.
ADA-kernel kernel in [14] ADA-GMM 0.9703 0.9746 0.9918 Table 1 : AUC scores on MNIST dataset with FGSM attack Since we first detect and then classify if there are no detections, our system changes the distribution of the samples being classified (only those not falsely detected as attacks), which could in principle affect accuracy of the classifier. However, we have found that at relatively modest false detection rates (e.g. 5% or less), there are extremely modest changes in the classifier's (conditional) test set accuracy (based on the test set that excludes false detections). This is true for both MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Note that, beyond exploiting cs and c d , it is possible to define probability vectors on the full complement of classes, with KL divergence measured between these probability vectors. Anecdotally, we have found that the gains in going from use of cs and c d to use of all classes is typically modest, e.g. increasing modestly from 0.815 to 0.827 AUC on CIFAR for the basic ADA method. This validates the main idea of ADA -that an attack example is mainly expected classifies. Thus, with knowledge of the classifier, the attacker will know if his crafted sample is successful or not. 6 The JSMA attack in [5] was only applied to MNIST, not CIFAR-10.
to be "too atypical" with respect to c d and "too typical" with respect to cs.
ADA-ADA-kernel AW-ADA-maxKL kernel in [14] maxKL 0.8756 0.8289 0.8273 0.9235 Table 2 : AUC scores on CIFAR-10 dataset with FGSM attack Table 2 shows results on the CIFAR-10 dataset under the FGSM attack. AUCs are much lower than for MNIST. We believe this is due to the fact that the classes are much more confusable for CIFAR-10 (with only 0.82 test set accuracy). However, the maxKL paradigm still gives substantial AUC gains over both [14] and the basic, single layer ADA method (with the AUC improving from ∼0.83 to ∼0.88). To further improve detection accuracy on CIFAR-10, we implemented AW-ADA-maxKL, defined in Section 2. Note that, as seen from Table 2 , this method (which exploits uncertainty in Cs and class confusion matrix information) gives a big boost in ADA performance, with the AUC going from 0.8289 for the basic ADA method to 0.9235.
We also evaluated the performance of both AW-ADA-maxKL and L-AW-ADA-maxKL against CW attacks on CIFAR-10. As noted earlier, the best approach reported in [17] was a supervised detection approach, achieving 81% TPR at a 28% FPR. The unsupervised AW-ADA-maxKL detector (using GMM densities) achieves 85% TPR at 28% FPR and 81% TPR at 23% FPR. The L-AW-ADA-maxKL detector (using multivariate log-normal mixture densities) achieves what we believe is a current state-of-the-art result against CW: 81% TPR at 12% FPR, and 96% TPR at 28% FPR -much better than the results reported in [17] and also significantly better than (global) AW-ADA-maxKL. There of course is still potentially room for further improvement, as this is far from perfect detection performance. We also note that, as reported in [18] , L-AW-ADA-maxKL is the preferred version of ADA, achieving results superior to all other ADA variants in comprehensive experiments, considering various (attack, data set) pairs. ADA-region maxKL counting 0.9314 0.97 Table 3 : AUC scores of various anomaly detectors on MNIST under the JSMA attack. Table 3 evaluates two methods on the JSMA attack applied to MNIST. Note that ADA models the joint feature vector for a layer, which is a function of the entire image. Thus, we would expect that ADA is most suitable for detecting global attacks -this is borne out by our very strong detection results on MNIST for FGSM attacks in Table 1 . JSMA, however, strongly restricts the number of modified pixels (but necessitates gross changes be made to these pixels, in order to succeed in inducing misclassifications). JSMA, accordingly, is a more "local" attack. Thus, we might expect ADA not to perform as well in detecting JSMA attacks as FGSM attacks. This is borne out in Table 3 , where ADA-maxKL manages a respectable 0.93 AUC (but not nearly the 0.992 AUC achieved in detecting FGSM attacks). However, this is not to say that JSMA attacks are intrinsically "harder" to detect (see for example Figure 1 ). To demonstrate this, we constructed a very simple detector for JSMA attacks. Specifically, we simply count the number of disjoint contiguous white regions in the image. MNIST digits generally consist of a single white region 7 , where a region is defined as a collection of pixels that are "connected", with two white pixels connected if they are in the same first-order (8-pixel) neighborhood, and with an entire connected region defined by applying transitive closure on pixel connectedness over the whole image. By contrast, nearly all JSMA attack images have extra isolated white regions (associated with salt and pepper noise). Simply using the number of white regions in the image as a decision statistic yields 0.97 AUC on MNIST -this strong result for this very simple detector indicates the susceptibility of the JSMA attack to a (simple) anomaly detection strategy, even as the ADA approach is not most suitable for this attack.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have argued for an (in general, unsupervised) AD approach to detect test-time attacks on classifiers. The argument needed to be made because there is a common alternative approach [12] , [11] , [13] -to "correctly classify" in the face of the attack. We have proposed an unsupervised AD framework that builds on the Kullback-Leibler divergence, and incorporates a number of paradigms to achieve the strongest performance: accounting for destination class "atypicality" and source class "typicality", accounting for source class uncertainty, exploiting confusion matrix information, properly accounting for the non-negative support of features, modeling features from multiple DNN layers (and max-ing over their decision statistics), and performing comprehensive low-order (pairwise) feature density modeling. While we have achieved what we believe are state-ofthe-art results against the strongest attack (CW), there may still be room for further improvements. For example, in future we may consider use of mixture of factors analyzers for avoiding overfitting in modelling high-ddimensional (deep layer) feature vectors.
